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Abstract
Standard choice experiments are hampered by the fact that utility is either unknown
or imperfectly measured by experimenters. As a consequence, the inferences available to
researchers are limited. By contrast, we design a choice experiment where the objects are
valued according to only a single attribute with a continuous measure and we can observe
the true preferences of subjects. Subjects have an imperfect perception of the choice
objects but can improve the precision of their perception with cognitive e¤ort. Subjects
are given a choice set involving several lines of various lengths and are told to select one of
them. They strive to select the longest line because they are paid an amount that increases
with the length of their choice. Our design allows us to observe the search history, the
response times, and make unambiguous conclusions about the optimality of choices. We
nd a negative relationship between the demanding nature of the choice problems and
the likelihood that subjects select the optimal lines. We also nd a positive relationship
between the demanding nature of the choice problems and the response times. However,
we nd evidence that suboptimal choices are associated with longer response times than
are optimal choices. This result appears to be consistent with Fudenberg, Strack, and
Strzalecki (2018). Additionally, our experimental design permits a multinomial discrete
choice analysis. Our results suggest that the errors in our data are better described as
having a Gumbel distribution rather than a normal distribution. We also observe e¤ects
consistent with memory decay and attention. Finally, we nd evidence that choices in our
experiment exhibit the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property.
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1 Introduction
Standard choice experiments are hampered by the fact that utility is either unknown or imper-
fectly measured by experimenters. As a consequence, the inferences available to researchers
are limited. In contrast, we design a choice experiment where objects are valued according to
only a single attribute with a continuous measure and we can observe the exact value accruing
to the subjects. However, subjects do not always select the optimal choice because they have
an imperfect perception of the choice objects.
In our experiment, subjects are given choice sets consisting of lines of various lengths.
The subjects are directed to select one of the lines from the choice set. Subjects are paid an
amount that increases with the length of their selected line.
While we are able to observe the true objective length of each line, it is well-known that
subjects have imperfect perception the objective features of objects (Weber, 1834; Fechner,
1860; Thurstone, 1927a,b). This insight has led researchers to consider that subjects prefer-
ences might be imperfectly perceived by the subjects themselves and this serves as a justi-
cation for random choice and random utility models. Since the beginning of this literature,
authors have been making explicit references to Weber, Fechner, or Thurstone.1 Despite this
known connection between imperfect perception of objective properties and stochastic choice,
to our knowledge, ours is one of only a few experiments that employ the technique of using
an objectively measurable object as a proxy for utility.
In our experiment, subjects can only view one line at a time.2 There are otherwise no
restrictions on the nature of their search, as long as the choice occurred within 60 seconds.
Subjects have an imperfect perception of the choice objects but can improve the precision of
their perception with cognitive e¤ort. Our design allows us to unobtrusively observe the search
1See Bradley and Terry (1952), Luce (1959a, 1959b, 1994, 2005), Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1963),
McFadden (1974, 1976, 1981, 2001), Yellott (1977), Falmagne (1978), Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995),
Ballinger and Wilcox (1997), Loomis, Peterson, Champ, Brown, and Lucero (1998), Butler (2000), Butler and
Loomes (2007), Blavatskyy (2008, 2011), Caplin (2012), Lévy-Garboua, Maa, Masclet, and Terracol (2012),
Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015), Agranov and Ortoleva (2017), Argenziano and Gilboa (2017), Khaw,
Li, and Woodford (2017), Alós-Ferrer, Fehr, and Netzer (2018), Caplin, Csaba, Leahy, and Nov (2018), Navarro-
Martinez, Loomes, Isoni, Butler, and Alaoui (2018), Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger, Ortoleva, and Riella (2019),
Horan, Manzini, and Mariotti (2019), Olschewski, Newell, and Scheibehenne (2019), and Webb (2019).
2Also see Payne, Braunstein, and Carroll (1978) and Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993).
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history and the response times of the subjects. To our knowledge, ours is the rst example of
an experiment where utility is represented by a static, single-attribute physical quantity with
an uncountable measure in a (nearly) unrestricted choice setting.
It seems that choice problems with a larger number of lines in the choice set, a choice
set of lines of similar lengths, and a choice set involving longer lines are more demanding
for the subjects. We nd a negative relationship between these demanding choice problems
and the likelihood that subjects select the optimal lines. We also nd a positive relationship
between the demanding nature of the choice problems and the response times. However,
we nd evidence that suboptimal choices are associated with longer response times than are
optimal choices.3 This somewhat counterintuitive result emerges from a model where an agent
faces a choice with uncertain utility and there is a constant cost of gathering information
about the choice problem. In this setting, which seems to correspond to our experiment,
Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki (2018) show that suboptimal decisions will tend to take, on
average, a longer time. Additionally, our experimental design permits a multinomial discrete
choice analysis. Our results suggest that the errors are better described as having a Gumbel
distribution rather than a normal distribution. We also observe e¤ects that are consistent with
(possibly endogenous) memory decay and attention. Finally, we nd evidence that choices in
our dataset are consistent with the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property.
2 Related literature
2.1 Random utility and random choice
Numerous random utility or random choice experimental and theoretical papers have emerged
in an e¤ort to better understand choice.4 Some authors examine the role of consideration sets
3We also note that this result does not appear to be driven by endogeneity.
4A partial list of these e¤orts, not previously mentioned, would include Debreu (1958), Tversky (1969),
Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden (1989), Sopher and Gigliotti (1993), Loomes and Sugden (1995), Sopher and Nar-
ramore (2000), Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), Rubinstein and Salant (2006), Weibull, Mattsson, and Voorneveld
(2007), Tyson (2008), Caplin, Dean, and Martin (2011), Conte, Hey, and Mo¤att (2011), Reutskaja, Nagel,
Camerer, and Rangel (2011), Wilcox (2011), Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014), Loomes and Pogrebna
(2014), Woodford (2014), Caplin and Dean (2015), Caplin and Martin (2015), Cubitt, Navarro-Martinez, and
Starmer (2015), Matµejka and McKay (2015), Aguiar, Boccardi, and Dean (2016), Apesteguia, Ballester, and
Lu (2017), Dean and Neligh (2017), Ahumada and Ulku (2018), Apesteguia and Ballester (2018), Echenique,
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(Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay, 2012; Manzini and Mariotti, 2014), private information
(Lu, 2016), the preference for randomness (Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017; Cerreia-Vioglio,
Dillenberger, Ortoleva, and Riella, 2019), and the preference for exibility (Ahn and Sarver,
2013) in explaining the apparent randomness in choice data. These factors help us understand
choice, but it is our view that imperfect perception of ones preferences is fundamental in every
choice setting. In our experiment, there is no plausible preference for randomization, there is
no preference for exibility, there is no private information, there are not multiple attributes
that could possibly interact (for instance, as compliments or substitutes), and we can observe
the consideration set. Despite the simple and objective nature of our setting, we observe choice
that is apparently random.
Further, the experimental study of imperfect perception of ones preferences tends to be
hampered by the fact that utility is typically unknown or imperfectly measured. However,
because we know the objective value of the imperfectly perceived choice objects, our design
yields a unique dataset with which to study random choice.
2.2 Choice involving imperfectly perceived objects
We are not the rst authors to study choice in a setting where material outcomes depend on
imperfectly perceived objects with objectively measurable properties. For instance, researchers
have made payments to subjects as a function of judgments involving the relative quantity of
dots (Caplin and Dean, 2015; Dutilh and Rieskamp, 2016), the dominant direction of moving
dots (Bhui, 2019a; 2019b), the number of ickering dots (Oud et al., 2016), a dynamic display
of dots (Zeigenfuse, Pleskac, and Liu, 2014), the heights of bars of dynamic size (Tsetsos et
al., 2016), and the area occupied by objects of various sizes (Polanía, Krajbich, Grueschow,
and Ru¤, 2014).5
To our knowledge, Du¤y, Gussman, and Smith (2019) is the only other paper that de-
scribes a choice experiment where suboptimal choices are perfectly observable because utility
Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018), Koida (2018), Kovach and Tserenjigmid (2018), Caplin, Dean, and Leahy
(2019), Cattaneo, Ma, Masatlioglu, and Suleymanov (2019), Conte and Hey (2019), and Natenzon (2019).
5Gabaix et al. (2006) and Sanjurjo (2015, 2017) also describe experiments where the experimenter knows
the choice object with the highest objective value. However, due to computational limitations (rather than
imperfect perception in our setting) the subjects often do not make the optimal selection.
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is represented by a static, single-attribute physical quantity with an uncountable measure.
However, Du¤y, Gussman, and Smith (2019) was conducted under time restrictions and the
subjects were placed under a di¤erential cognitive load. Therefore, our paper appears to be
the only example of an experiment where utility is represented by a static, single-attribute
physical quantity with an uncountable measure in a (nearly) unrestricted choice setting.
2.3 Response times and choice
Observations of response times have been used to gain insights on choice, beyond those avail-
able by simply observing the outcome of the decision.6 One key insight from this literature is
that longer response times tend to be associated with choices or judgments that are closer to
indi¤erence.7 We observe similar results in our setting: choice sets with lines of more similar
lengths are associated with longer response times. We also observe longer response times both
for choice sets with a larger number of lines and for choice sets with longer lines.
In many choice problems, it is not clear if a suboptimal decision was made. However,
in perceptual decision problems, optimal choices can easily be distinguished from suboptimal
choices. Researchers nd a negative relationship between accuracy of these perceptual choices
and response times.8 In other words, suboptimal choices tend to take a longer time than do
optimal actions.9 ;10 Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki (2018), demonstrate that this relation-
ship emerges from a model of an agent in a choice problem with unknown utility and a cost
of acquiring information about the choice options. This setup appears to be similar to our
6See Clithero (2018) and Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2018) for recent overviews of the response time liter-
ature in economics.
7For instance, see Henmon (1911), Volkmann (1934), Dashiell (1937), Mosteller and Nogee (1951), Jamieson
and Petrusic (1977), Hey (1995), Mo¤att (2005), Chen and Fischbacher (2016), Alós-Ferrer, Grani´c, Kern, and
Wagner (2016), Echenique and Saito (2017), Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani (2019), and Konovalov and Krajbich
(2019).
8For instance, see Henmon (1911), Kellogg (1931), Swensson (1972), and Bhui (2019b).
9Swensson (1972), Luce (1986), and Ratcli¤ and McKoon (2008) note that this relationship tends to hold
when the experimenter emphasizes the accuracy of the decision. The authors also note that the opposite rela-
tionship between errors and response times holds when the speed of the decision is stressed by the experimenter.
10 In general settings, caution should be used when examining the relationship between response times and
suboptimal actions. For example, Rubinstein (2013) nds shorter response times on responses that are clearly
mistakes. By contrast Kiss, Rodriguez-Lara, Rosa-Garcia (2020) nd that in decisions where there is a dominant
strategy, suboptimal decisions are associated with longer response times. Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2014) nd
that if the optimal decision is in conict with reinforcement learning then optimal responses tend to have longer
response times, but in the event that they are aligned, then optimal responses tend to have shorter response
times.
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experiment. Consistent with the predictions of Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki, we nd
evidence that suboptimal decisions are associated with longer responses times. Further, our
result does not appear to be endogenous.
3 Experimental design
3.1 Overview
The experiment was programmed on E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pitts-
burgh, PA). The sessions were performed on standard 21:5 inch (54:6 cm) Dell EliteDisplay
E221 monitors. E-Prime imposed a resolution of 1024 pixels by 768 pixels. A total of 112
subjects participated in the experiment.
3.2 Line selection task
In each trial, subjects were presented a choice set of lines that ranged in number between
2 and 6. Each of these choice set sizes occurred with probability 1
5
and were drawn with
replacement. Subjects were able to only view one line at a time. The lines were labeled in
alphabetic order in the center of the screen. Letters A and B always represented the rst two
options, and consecutive letters were added as needed. Subjects could view a particular line
by clicking on the letter label that corresponds to that particular line. To view another line,
subjects click on its corresponding label. This would make the new line appear and the old
line disappear.
Each line appeared within a rectangular region of 400 pixels in the horizontal direction
and 150 pixels in the vertical direction. The boundaries of these regions were not visible to
the subjects. The lines were randomly o¤set, both vertically and horizontally, within these
regions such that there was a minimum cushion between the line and the edge of the region.
This cushion was 20 pixels in the horizontal direction and 10 pixels in the vertical direction.
The o¤setting was xed for each line throughout each trial. The regions were non-overlapping
and arranged in 2 columns and 3 rows, with the regions for A and B in the top row, the
regions for C and D in the middle row, and the regions for E and F in the bottom row.
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The length of the lines in any trial were determined by subtracting various amounts from
the longest line. There were 10 possible longest line lengths, ranging in 16 pixel (0:73 cm)
increments from 160 pixels (7:4 cm) to 304 pixels (14:1 cm). The lines each had a height of
0:36 cm and were the identical shade of grey. Each of the 10 possible longest line lengths
appeared in 10 trials and in random order.
There were three di¢culty treatments. In the di¢cult treatment, one line was exactly
one pixel shorter than the longest, and the other di¤erences were drawn from a uniform on
f 1; :::; 10g. In themedium treatment, one line was exactly 11 pixels shorter than the longest
and the other di¤erences were drawn from a uniform on f 11; :::; 30g. In the easy treatment,
one line was exactly 31 pixels shorter than the longest, and the other di¤erences were drawn
from a uniform on f 31; :::; 60g. Therefore, the shortest possible line was 100 pixels. The
di¢cult, medium, and easy treatments each occurred with probability 1
3
, in random order,
and were drawn with replacement. The subjects were not informed of the existence of these
treatments.
Adjacent to each letter label was a box indicating that the subject currently selected that
line. Subjects could change this selection at any time during the allotted 60 seconds. The
subjects could view the time remaining, rounded to the nearest second. See Figure 1 for a
screenshot11 and Figure 2 for a characterization of the regions, which were not visible to the
subjects.
11See https://osf.io/f7gu4 for the full set of screenshots.
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Figure 1: Screenshot from a trial with 5 lines in the choice set, where line A is being viewed,
line D is currently selected, and there are 53 seconds remaining.
8
Figure 2: A characterization of the regions, invisible to the subjects, which contain the
corresponding lines.
The choice within each trial was the line that was selected when either the subject hit the
Enter key or when the allotted 60 seconds elapsed. The earnings on this task were increasing
in the length of the choice in that trial. Specically, if a line x pixels in length was selected
then in that trial the subject earned:
$5 
(x  100)
(304  100)
.
In other words, the payment was $5 multiplied by the fraction of the di¤erence between the
selected line and the shortest possible line with the di¤erence between the longest possible line
and the shortest possible line. If subjects did not select a line before they hit Enter or before
time expired, it was assumed that the selected line had a length of 100, thereby earning 0 in
that trial.
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There was a 3 second stage between any two line judgment tasks where the subjects were
told, "Relax. . . wait 3 seconds before new trial. DO NOT press RETURN without clicking on
a box."
At the start of every trial, the location of the mouse on the screen was randomly deter-
mined. Each computer had the mouse speed setting of 6 out of 11.
3.3 Unincentivized practice
The subjects had an unincentivized practice on the line selection task. If the subjects did not
view any lines, did not select a line that they viewed, or did not select any lines, the subjects
were informed of this and were directed to repeat the practice line selection task.
3.4 Survey questions
After every line trial was completed, but before the subjects were paid, the subjects were
given a set of survey questions, administered via paper. We elicited the gender of the subject,
the handedness (right or left) of the subject, and the standard versions of the 3 Cognitive
Reection Test (CRT) questions (Frederick, 2005).12 ;13
3.5 Experimental details
Three line selection trials were randomly selected for payment. Additionally, subjects were
paid a $5 show-up fee. Subjects were paid in cash and amounts were rounded up to the nearest
$0:25. Subjects earned a mean of $14:50.
There were 112 subjects each completing 100 line selection trials. However, there were 80
trials in which no line was viewed by the subject, 145 trials in which no line was selected by the
subject, and 211 trials (1:88%) in which either no line was selected or no line was viewed. We
12See https://osf.io/f7gu4 for the version that was given to the subjects.
13The subjects were also asked to provide an optional estimate of their grade point average (between 0:0
and 4:0). However, the response rate was su¢ciently low (92 of 112 subjects o¤ered some response) and many
responses were di¢cult to interpret. Therefore, we do not include this in our analyses. Additionally, the subjects
were asked to provide an optional estimate of their SAT or ACT percentile rank. Again, many responses were
incomplete or di¢cult to interpret, therefore we do not include these responses in the analysis.
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exclude these trials from the analysis because we do not know how to interpret these trials. We
therefore have 10; 989 valid line selection trials. The data is available at https://osf.io/f7gu4.
3.6 Discussion of the design
We do not put any constraints on the nature of the search, beyond the 60 second limit and
the restriction that only one line can be viewed at a time. This allows us to measure response
times and search histories as unobtrusively as possible.
The design of the interface was motivated by Du¤y, Gussman, and Smith (2019), who
found a negative relationship between accuracy on a trial and the distance between the line
with the longest length and its letter label. However, the options with a larger distance
between the line and the label also tended to have a larger time that had elapsed since the
line was last viewed at the end of the trial. Therefore, Du¤y, Gussman, and Smith were not
able to distinguish between the temporal explanation and the distance explanation. However,
we improve on this design in that every option has the identical distance between the line and
the label.
4 Results
4.1 Optimality of choices
Here we explore the optimality of choices. We dene the Selected longest variable to be 1 if
the choice was the longest line in the choice set, and 0 otherwise. We conduct regressions
with the Selected longest variable as dependent variable. As the dependent variable is binary,
we employ a logistic specication. Since the Selected longest variable appears to be a¤ected
by the di¢culty treatments, the number of lines treatments, the longest line treatments, and
the letter that contained the longest line, we include these as independent variables.14 For
the di¢culty treatments, we include dummy variables indicating whether the treatment was
Easy or whether the treatment was Di¢cult. To account for the letter label of the longest
line, we o¤er specications where we estimate a unique dummy variable for each of the 20
14See Tables A1 A4 for the summary statistics. for Selected longest.
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combinations of letter-number of lines.15 Due to the repeated nature of the observations, we
also o¤er xed-e¤ects specications where we estimate a dummy variable for each subject.
We run other specications that control for the demographics of the subjects: whether the
subjects reported being left handed, whether the subjects reported being female, and the sum
of their CRT score. We summarize these regressions in Table 1.
Table 1: Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longest line normalized  0:0044  0:0044  0:0042  0:0042
(0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0005) (0:0005)
Number of lines normalized  0:257    0:242  
(0:018) (0:018)
Easy treatment dummy 2:273 2:291 2:205 2:219
(0:098) (0:099) (0:097) (0:097)
Di¢cult treatment dummy  1:729  1:747  1:630  1:646
(0:055) (0:056) (0:053) (0:053)
Trial  0:0017y  0:0019  0:0016y  0:0017
(0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0009)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects Y es Y es No No
Demographics No No Y es Y es
AIC 9716:7 9655:7 9893:5 9836:1
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. We
do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, the subject-
specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression
has 10; 989 observations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes
p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, we nd a negative relationship between the quality of the choice
and the features of the choice problem that we describe as demanding.16 We nd that the
accuracy of the choice decreases when there is a larger number of lines (choice overload e¤ects)
and decreases in the di¢culty treatments. Additionally, we see that the accuracy decreases in
the length of the longest line. This result could be interpreted as suggesting that subjects are
15As in Table A4. However, in the analysis immediately below we do not explore the e¤ect of the letter label
on the quality of the choice. We postpone our discussion of this issue until later in the paper.
16 In Table A8, we examine the robustness of these results. We conduct the analogous tobit regressions with
Longest line minus the selected line as the dependent variable. Our results are not changed.
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simply worse at judging longer lines than shorter lines. This explanation is consistent with
classic psychology (Fechner, 1860). On the other hand, it is possible that subjects expended
less e¤ort on trials with longer lines because they knew that they would earn more on these
trials. These e¤ort-wealth e¤ects provide another explanation for the negative coe¢cient
estimates for the Longest line variable. We will say more about this matter below. Finally,
we nd evidence that choices become less accurate across trials.
4.2 Quality of the Searches
The analysis above suggests a relationship between the quality of the choice and features of
the choice problem that we describe as demanding. It is not clear whether this relationship
is driven by low quality searches in these demanding choice problems. One measure of the
quality of the search is the number of lines viewed in the trial, where a higher number would
suggest more e¤ort in searching. We dene the View clicks variable to be the number of total
line view clicks in the trial. We conduct an analysis, identical to Table 1, with the exception
that the dependent variable is View clicks and the regression is linear, not logistic. Table 2
summarizes this analysis.
Table 2: Regressions of the View clicks variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longest line normalized 0:002 0:002 0:002 0:002
(0:0008) (0:0008) (0:0009) (0:0009)
Number of lines normalized 1:876   1:896  
(0:026) (0:031)
Easy treatment dummy  2:084  2:090  2:006  2:006
(0:090) (0:090) (0:107) (0:107)
Di¢cult treatment dummy 1:338 1:333 1:374 1:376
(0:090) (0:090) (0:106) (0:106)
Trial  0:024  0:024  0:024  0:024
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects Y es Y es No No
Demographics No No Y es Y es
AIC 60559:2 60545:9 64415:6 64399:7
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. We
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do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, the subject-
specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion. Each regression has 10; 989 obser-
vations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y
denotes p < 0:1.
The results summarized in Table 2 seem to suggest that there is a positive relationship
between the quality of the search and the demanding nature of the choice problem. The
number of view clicks is increasing in the length of the longest line, increasing in the number
of lines in the choice set, and increasing in the di¢culty treatments. This suggests to us that
more, not less, e¤ort was devoted to demanding choice problems. We also note that there
is a negative relationship between view clicks and trial, suggesting a decrease in e¤ort across
trials.
We admit that the number of lines viewed is one of many measures of the quality of the
search. Another such measure is the response time on the trial. We conduct an analysis,
identical to that in Table 2, but we employ the log of the response time as the dependent
variable.17 Table 3 summarizes this analysis.18
Table 3: Regressions of the log of Response time variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longest line normalized 0:0003 0:0003 0:0003 0:0003
(0:00004) (0:00004) (0:00004) (0:00004)
Number of lines normalized 0:083   0:083  
(0:0012) (0:0014)
Easy treatment dummy  0:118  0:118  0:117  0:116
(0:004) (0:004) (0:005) (0:005)
Di¢cult treatment dummy 0:057 0:057 0:056 0:056
(0:004) (0:004) (0:005) (0:005)
Trial  0:002  0:002  0:002  0:002
(0:00006) (0:00006) (0:00007) (0:00007)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects Y es Y es No No
Demographics No No Y es Y es
AIC  6089:7  6066:4  2591:5  2555:1
17See Tables A1 A4 for the summary statistics.
18Although negative AIC values are somewhat unusual, negative values are possible and it remains the case
that lower values indicate a better t.
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We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. We
do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, the subject-
specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion. Each regression has 10; 989 obser-
vations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y
denotes p < 0:1.
It seems that response times are larger for decisions that are more demanding: a larger
number of lines in the choice set, the di¢culty of the treatment, and the length of the longest
line in the trial. Based on the results of Tables 2 and 3, it seems that subjects expend more,
not less, e¤ort on demanding trials. Therefore we cannot explain the longest line length results
of Table 1 as due to diminished e¤ort.
4.3 Relationship between quality of choice and consideration sets
There is a literature that posits that suboptimal choice occurs because subjects do not consider
every object in the choice set, but only a subset. Further this consideration set is not typically
observable to the experimenter. However, due to our design, we are able to observe whether
subjects viewed the longest line.
Among the 10; 956 trials where subjects viewed the longest line, there are 3302 observations
where the longest line was not selected. However, in none of the 33 trials where subjects did
not view the longest line, was the longest line selected. Therefore in our data, 99:0% of the
suboptimal choices occurred in trials where subjects viewed the longest line. This suggests
that the bulk of our suboptimal choices can be explained due to imperfect perception, rather
than not considering the longest line.
In Table 1, we explored whether subjects optimally select the longest line by conducting
regressions with the Selected longest line variable. Another question is whether subjects
selected the longest line, among the lines that were viewed. We dene the Selected longest line
viewed variable to be 1 if the longest line among those viewed was selected, and 0 otherwise.
We conduct an analysis, similar to Table 1 but rather than using the Selected longest line
variable, we employ the Selected longest line viewed variable. We summarize these regressions
in Table 4.
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Table 4: Logistic regressions of Selected longest line viewed variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longest line normalized  0:0042  0:0042  0:0040  0:0040
(0:0006) (0:0006) (0:0005) (0:0005)
Number of lines normalized  0:249    0:235  
(0:018) (0:018)
Easy treatment dummy 2:304 2:322 2:240 2:253
(0:100) (0:100) (0:099) (0:099)
Di¢cult treatment dummy  1:719  1:737  1:626  1:643
(0:055) (0:056) (0:053) (0:053)
Trial  0:0014  0:0016y  0:0014  0:0015y
(0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0009)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects Y es Y es No No
Demographics No No Y es Y es
AIC 9712:7 9651:9 9865:6 9808:8
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. We
do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, the subject-
specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion. Each regression has 10; 989 obser-
vations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y
denotes p < 0:1.
The results of Table 4 are similar to those in Table 1. Further, the suboptimal choices
that we observe in our experiment do not appear to be driven by consideration set e¤ects.
Rather, the suboptimal choices appear to be driven by imperfect perception of the objectively
measurable choice objects.
4.4 Relationship between quality of choice and response times
Response times of the trials in which the longest line was selected (mean = 12:250s, SD =
8:426) are smaller than the response times in trials in which the longest line was not selected
(mean = 15:730s, SD = 10:428), according to a Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test (Z = 18:915, p <
0:001). This e¤ect is further robust across longest line treatments, number of line treatments,
and di¢culty treatments.19
In order to more carefully investigate this matter, we conduct regressions with the log
of Response time as the dependent variable. We employ specications similar to those in
19See Tables A5 A7.
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Table 3, however we include Selected longest as an independent variable. Further, for those
specications without xed-e¤ects, we include an independent variable that is the average of
the log of the Response times for that particular subject. We summarize this analysis in Table
5.
Table 5: Regressions of the log of Response time variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longest line normalized 0:0003 0:0003 0:0003 0:0003
(0:00004) (0:00004) (0:00004) (0:00004)
Number of lines normalized 0:083   0:082  
(0:0012) (0:0012)
Easy treatment dummy  0:115  0:115  0:114  0:114
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Di¢cult treatment dummy 0:051 0:052 0:051 0:052
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Trial  0:002  0:002  0:002  0:002
(0:00006) (0:00006) (0:00006) (0:00006)
Selected Longest  0:016  0:014  0:016  0:014
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Subs Average log RT     0:994 0:992
(0:014) (0:014)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects Y es Y es No No
Demographics No No Y es Y es
AIC  6093:4  6067:4  6680:2  6651:1
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. We
do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, the subject-
specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion. Each regression has 10; 989 obser-
vations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y
denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, the Selected Longest variable is negative and signicant. We inter-
pret this as suggesting that, even when controlling for the xed characteristics of the subjects,
suboptimal choices tend to take longer than optimal choices.
The reader is likely concerned about endogeneity because the Selected longest variable
is possibly correlated with the errors in the regressions. However, when we conduct Spear-
man correlations between the unstandardized residuals and the Selected longest variable in
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specications (1)   (4), the p-values, respectively, are 0:94, 0:92, 0:92, and 0:89. When we
conduct Pearson correlations, the qualitative results are not changed. Further, our qualitative
results are not changed when we use the student residuals rather than the unstandardized
residuals.20 We interpret this as suggesting that our specications are not su¤ering from an
endogeneity bias caused by the inclusion of the Selected longest variable. We conclude that
the relationship between response times and the optimality of the choice is not driven by
a possible subject-level relationship between skill at the task and the speed by which it is
accomplished.
4.5 Multinomial discrete choice analysis and the nature of the stochastic
utility
An assumption in multinomial discrete choice analysis is that choice is stochastic because
of an unobserved stochastic component in the utility function.21 A common specication in
these random utility models (RUM) is that there is a non-stochastic component of the utility
function and an additive stochastic component. For example, option j would have utility:
Uj = Vj + j ,
where Vj is the non-stochastic component and j is the random component. RUMs typically
assume that agents select the item with the largest realized utility. Specically, a choice of i
from the set K = f1; :::; kg arises when:
Vi + i  Vj + j for every j 2 K.
Further, the non-stochastic components to the RUMs are not typically observable. There-
fore researchers include a set of observable features possibly relevant to the choice j, xj =
(xj1; :::; xjn). In order to account for the e¤ect of each of these factors, researchers also es-
20 In Table A9, we o¤er a robustness check of Table 5. There we estimate a treatment variable coe¢cient for
every subject. Our qualitative results are not changed.
21For instance, see McFadden (1974, 1976, 1981, 2001).
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timate  = (1; :::; n). In these settings, the estimate of the non-stochastic component is
Vj =   xj . However, in our setting, the length of the line is the only relevant attribute.
Therefore, the non-stochastic component of option j simplies to:
Vj =   Lengthj ,
where  is a scalar.
We also note that there is a number of specications of the stochastic component. For
instance, j might be assumed to be normally distributed. On the other hand, the stochastic
component might also be assumed to have the Gumbel distribution, e e
 
. (Confusingly, this is
also referred to as the Type I extreme-value distribution, the double exponential distribution,
and the log-Weibull distribution.) In our experiment, we can perfectly observe the objective
lengths of the lines and the choices made by the subjects. We can therefore run specications
that employ either of these assumptions of the error distribution and observe which provides
a better t.
We run one specication where the stochastic component has the Gumbel distribution and
is independently and identically distributed for every option. As McFadden (1974) and Yellot
(1977) show, this structure implies the Luce (1959a) stochastic choice model, whereby the
probability that option j is selected from set K is:
P (j) =
eLengthjX
k2K
eLengthk
.
We refer to this Conditional Logistic model as "Logit" and denote it as specication (1).
We also run a specication where the stochastic component is assumed to have a normal
distribution and is independently and identically distributed for every option. Yellot (1977)
shows that this corresponds to Case V of Thurstone (1927a). We refer to this Multinomial
Probit model as "Probit" and denote it as specication (2).
It is not clear that the linear specication of Length is the most appropriate. There are
researchers who argue that there is not a linear relationship between stimuli and the perception
19
of stimuli, but rather they are related by the log function (Fechner, 1860).22 According to
this classic view in psychology, the non-stochastic component of the utility function should be
specied as:
Vj =   log(Lengthj).
With this "Log" specication, we conduct an analysis that assumes that the errors have a
Gumbel distribution. We denote this specication as (3). Also within this Log specication,
we conduct an analysis that assumes that errors have a normal distribution. We denote this
specication as (4).
There are other researchers who argue that the relationship between stimuli and the per-
ception of the stimuli is neither linear nor logarithmic, but is rather described by the power
function (Stevens, 1961). Research suggests that the specication of this power function
depends on the type of stimulus. Some research suggests that the exponent in the power
function, when the stimulus is length, is 1:04 (Teghtsoonian, 1971). According to this view,
the non-stochastic component of the utility function should be specied as:
Vj =   (Lengthj)
1:04.
With this "Power" specication, we conduct an analysis that assumes that the errors have a
Gumbel distribution. We denote this specication as (5). Also within this Power specication,
we conduct an analysis that assumes that errors have a normal distribution. We denote this
specication as (6):
We report the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1974) for each specication,
restricted to a particular number of lines treatment. We also report the estimate of  for each
model in each setting. These analyses23 are summarized in Table 6.
22This is a version of what is sometimes referred to as Fechners Law.
23Each specication was executed with the MDC (multinomial discrete choice) procedure in SAS. Speci-
cations (1), (3), and (5) were performed with the clogit option. Specication (2), (4), and (6) were performed
with the mprobit option.
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Table 6: Comparisons of di¤erent multinomial discrete choice models
Linear Log Power
Logit Probit Logit Probit Logit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2 Lines  est. 0:126 0:097 64:193 49:104 0:097 0:075
AIC 1917 1928 1899 1913 1919 1930
3 Lines  est. 0:139 0:104 69:951 51:525 0:108 0:080
AIC 2602 2607 2615 2629 2603 2608
4 Lines  est. 0:144 0:163 72:918 57:223 0:112 0:112
AIC 3218 3513 3197 3228 3220 3384
5 Lines  est. 0:135 0:194 66:324 45:846 0:105 0:074
AIC 4046 5166 4066 4113 4047 4067
6 Lines  est. 0:131 0:089 64:954 43:736 0:101 0:069
AIC 4394 4407 4386 4402 4397 4410
We provide the estimates of  and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for
the various models restricted to treatments with identical numbers of lines. Each
of the estimates for  are signicantly di¤erent from 0 with p < 0:001.
Regardless of the specication (Linear, Log, or Power) and regardless of the number of
lines treatment, we nd that the Logit specication has a lower AIC than the corresponding
Probit specication. We interpret these results as suggesting that the models, which assume
that the errors have a Gumbel distribution, provide a better t than the models that assume
that errors have a normal distribution.
4.6 Memory decay and choice
Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer, and Rangel (2011) report that the quality of choices tend to be
diminishing in number of items viewed between the last item viewed and the best item viewed.
Here we examine whether our subjects exhibit similar behavior that is consistent with memory
decay.
There appears to be a relationship between the quality of the choice and number of letters
alphabetically between the letter label of the longest line and the last letter label in the choice
set.24 Below, we test whether there is such a relationship. Similar to the analysis summarized
in Table 1, the dependent variable is Selected longest and we include the same specications
for the treatment variables and the Trial variable.
24See Table A4.
21
We introduce the Distance from last variable, which provides a measure of the alphabetic
distance between the letter label of the longest line and the last alphabetic letter label in the
choice set. For instance, in the 2 Line treatment, if line A is the longest then the variable is 1
and if line B is the longest then 0. In the 3 Line treatment, if A is the longest then the variable
is 2, if B is the longest then 1, and if C is the longest then 0. We include Distance from last as
an independent variable. We also include specications with the interaction between the Trial
variable and the Distance from last variable. For identication reasons, we do not include the
Letter dummy variables. We also include specications with an independent variable of the
average of the Selected longest variable for that particular subject. We include these with
the demographics and we denote their inclusion with Demographics+. We summarize these
regressions in Table 7.
Table 7: Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance from last  0:151  0:149  0:138  0:137
(0:021) (0:021) (0:039) (0:038)
Longest line normalized  0:005  0:004  0:005  0:004
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines normalized  0:183  0:178  0:183  0:178
(0:021) (0:021) (0:021) (0:021)
Easy treatment dummy 2:282 2:258 2:282 2:258
(0:098) (0:098) (0:098) (0:098)
Di¢cult treatment dummy  1:736  1:702  1:736  1:702
(0:056) (0:055) (0:056) (0:055)
Trial  0:0018  0:0017y  0:0014  0:0014
(0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0013) (0:0013)
Trial*Distance from last      0:0003  0:0002
(0:0006) (0:0006)
Letter dummies No No No No
Fixed e¤ects Y es No Y es No
Demographics+ No Y es No Y es
AIC 9668:3 9498:6 9670:1 9500:5
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the subject-specic dummies
in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates. AIC refers to the
Akaike information criterion. Each regression has 10; 989 observations.  denotes
p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
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In each specication, the Distance from last coe¢cient estimate is signicant and negative.
This suggests the presence of memory decay in the subjects.
One explanation for the negative coe¢cient estimates for the Distance from last variable
is that subjects view the lines in alphabetical order (A then B then C etc.). However, lines
viewed in the more distant past are recalled with a lower precision: either the location of the
longest line or the length of the longest line. To explore this possibility, we dene the variable
Time since longest to be the time elapsed since subjects viewed the longest line when the trial
ended. Table 8 demonstrates the relationship between the Time since longest variable and the
letter label of the longest line in that trial.
Table 8: Time since longest line by number of lines and letter label of the longest
A B C D E F
2 Lines 0:828 s 0:485 s        
3 Lines 1:393 s 1:064 s 0:954 s      
4 Lines 2:096 s 2:026 s 1:400 s 1:239 s    
5 Lines 3:012 s 2:629 s 2:403 s 2:214 s 1:662 s  
6 Lines 3:991 s 3:480 s 2:978 s 2:338 s 2:819 s 2:201 s
Table 8 suggests that there is a negative relationship between the Time since longest
variable and the number of letter labels alphabetically between the longest line and the last
letter label in the choice set. Here we test whether such a relationship is related to the
optimality of choice in the trial. To do so, we conduct an analysis similar to Table 7, however
we employ the Time since longest variable, rather than the Distance from last variable. We
summarize these regressions in Table 9.
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Table 9: Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time since longest  0:844  0:794  0:666  0:623
(0:022) (0:021) (0:037) (0:035)
Longest line normalized  0:004  0:004  0:004  0:004
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines normalized 0:077 0:063 0:082 0:069
(0:023) (0:023) (0:024) (0:023)
Easy treatment dummy 2:442 2:432 2:457 2:451
(0:124) (0:122) (0:125) (0:122)
Di¢cult treatment dummy  1:677  1:650  1:681  1:655
(0:069) (0:067) (0:069) (0:067)
Trial  0:005  0:005 0:0006 0:0006
(0:001) (0:001) (0:0015) (0:0014)
Trial*Time since longest      0:004  0:004
(0:0007) (0:0007)
Letter dummies No No No No
Fixed e¤ects Y es No Y es No
Demographics+ No Y es No Y es
AIC 6816:0 6741:4 6785:2 6712:0
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the subject-specic dummies
in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates. AIC refers to the
Akaike information criterion. Each regression has 10; 989 observations.  denotes
p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
We nd a negative relationship between the time elapsed since the longest line was viewed
at the end of the trial and the quality of the choice. This result is consistent with the possibility
that subjects su¤er from memory decay. We also note the negative Trial-Time since longest
interaction. This suggests that the e¤ects consistent with memory decay are exacerbated
across trials. While the other coe¢cient estimates resemble those from Table 1, it should be
noted that the Number of lines estimate is positive. This suggests that, when accounting for
the Time since longest variable, there is a positive relationship between the number of lines
and selecting the longest line.
However, the results summarized in Table 9 should be viewed with caution. The Spearman
correlations between the Time since longest variable and the residuals (both unstandardized
and Pearson standardized) are each signicant at 0:001. This suggests that our regressions
could su¤er from an endogeneity bias.
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Overall the results from Tables 7 and 9 suggest e¤ects that are consistent with memory
decay. It appears that lines viewed in the more distant past are remembered with a lower
precision. Du¤y, Gussman, and Smith (2019) also found evidence of memory decay, yet their
interface had a feature that not every item in the choice set had an equal distance between the
line and its letter label. It is possible that the Du¤y, Gussman, and Smith design exacerbated
a di¤erential memory decay. However, in our interface, every line is equidistant from its letter
label and we nd di¤erential e¤ect consistent with (possibly endogenous) memory decay.
4.7 Attention and choice
Testing for evidence consistent with memory decay is not the only such investigation on the
e¤ects of limited cognitive resources. Here we investigate the role of attention in choice.
Research nds that the time that a subject spends viewing (or xated on) an object in a
choice setting is associated with a higher likelihood of selecting the object.25 One measure of
attention is the total time spent viewing a line. We perform an analysis, similar to Tables 7
and 9, but with Time viewing longest as an independent variable. This variable sums the time,
possibly across multiple durations, which the subject viewed the longest line in the choice set.
We summarize these regressions in Table 10.
25See Armel, Beaumel, and Rangel (2008), Armel and Rangel (2008), Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010),
and Krajbich and Rangel (2011).
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Table 10: Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time viewing longest 0:164 0:134 0:126 0:103
(0:011) (0:010) (0:017) (0:016)
Longest line normalized  0:005  0:005  0:005  0:005
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines normalized  0:260  0:255  0:259  0:254
(0:019) (0:019) (0:019) (0:019)
Easy treatment dummy 2:412 2:365 2:412 2:363
(0:099) (0:098) (0:099) (0:098)
Di¢cult treatment dummy  1:778  1:739  1:781  1:742
(0:057) (0:056) (0:057) (0:056)
Trial 0:002 0:0015  0:0011  0:0012
(0:0009) (0:0009) (0:0015) (0:0015)
Trial*Time viewing longest     0:0009 0:0008
(0:0003) (0:0003)
Letter dummies No No No No
Fixed e¤ects Y es No Y es No
Demographics+ No Y es No Y es
AIC 9459:3 9329:5 9453:6 9325:9
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the subject-specic dummies
in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates. AIC refers to the
Akaike information criterion. Each regression has 10; 989 observations.  denotes
p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, the quality of the choice is increasing in the time viewing the longest
line. A similar result is reported by Krajbich and Rangel (2011). We interpret this as consistent
with attention being related to choice. We also nd that the interaction between Trial and
Time viewing longest is positive. This provides some evidence that the attention e¤ects become
stronger across trials.
Similar to the analysis summarized in Table 9, we interpret these results with caution due
to the possibility of endogeneity introduced by including the Time viewing longest variable.
Similar to the analysis from Table 9, the Spearman correlations between the Time viewing
longest variable and the residuals (both unstandardized and Pearson standardized) are each
signicant at 0:001. These results suggest that (possibly endogenous) attention is related to
choice.
26
4.8 Independence from irrelevant alternatives
Our dataset provides a unique opportunity to test the independence from irrelevant alterna-
tives (IIA) property. Recall that our choice sets always involve a longest line and another line
that is a specic amount shorter than this longest line. The di¤erence between these lines is 1
pixel in the di¢cult treatment, 11 pixels in the medium treatment, and 31 pixels in the easy
treatment. Choice sets with more than 2 lines are constructed by including lines that have
lengths less than or equal to the shorter of these lines. We now refer to lines in the di¢cult
treatment 1 pixel shorter than the longest, lines in the medium treatment 11 pixels shorter
than the longest, or lines in the easy treatment 31 pixels shorter than the longest to be the
second longest line in the choice set.
To test IIA in our setting, we can observe if the ratio of the probability that the longest
line is selected and the probability that the second longest line is selected varies with the size
of the choice set.26 Because not every trial has a unique second longest line, we only consider
observations with a unique second longest line. Further, since we are interested in the relative
selection of the longest and the second longest line, we consider only trials in which either
the longest or the second longest lines were selected. This allows us to interpret the Selected
longest variable as the relative choice between the longest and the second longest lines. Due to
the non-monotonic relationship between the size of the choice set and the choices, we estimate
a unique dummy variable for each choice set size. In order to investigate the e¤ect of the
size of the choice set on choice, we report the Wald statistic for the Number of lines dummy
variables. We also report the associated p-value.
The other elements of the analysis are similar to that presented above. We summarize
these regressions in Table 11.
26See Table A10 for the summary statistics involving the longest line and the second longest line choices.
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Table 11: Logistic regressions of the Selected longest line variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longest line normalized    0:004  0:004  0:004
(0:0007) (0:0007) (0:0007)
Easy treatment dummy 2:208 2:224 2:224 2:259
(0:125) (0:125) (0:125) (0:126)
Di¢cult treatment dummy  1:388  1:386  1:387  1:437
(0:065) (0:065) (0:065) (0:067)
Trial      0:001  0:001
(0:001) (0:001)
Number of lines Wald statistic 4:77 4:32 4:31 4:84
p-value of Wald statistic 0:31 0:36 0:37 0:30
Letter dummies No No No No
Fixed e¤ects No No No No
Demographics+ No No No Y es
AIC 6634:3 6606:9 6607:5 6429:7
We only consider trials with a unique second longest line and those in which
either the longest line or the second longest line was selected. We provide the
coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. We do not provide
the estimates of the intercepts, the Number of lines dummy estimates, or the de-
mographics estimates. We report the Wald statistic and its corresponding p-value
for the Number of lines dummy estimates. AIC refers to the Akaike informa-
tion criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression has 8; 628 observations.  denotes
p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In every specication, the size of the choice set is not signicantly related to the relative
choice of the longest and the second longest lines. We interpret this as consistent with the IIA
property. The other results in Table 11, are largely consistent with the analyses summarized
above. The relative choice of the longest and second longest lines are decreasing in the di¢culty
treatments and decreasing in the length of the longest line. However, we note that the Trial
coe¢cient estimate is not signicant.
The results in Table 11 seem to suggest that the well-documented violations of IIA stem
from details in a specic choice setting (for instance, a particular prole of multiple attributes)
rather than being a general feature across all choice settings.
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5 Conclusion
We conduct an idealized choice experiment where the choice set is populated with objects that
are valued according to only a single, static attribute with a continuous measure and we can
observe the true preferences of subjects. Subjects have an imperfect perception of the choice
objects but can improve the precision of their perception with cognitive e¤ort. Subjects are
given a choice set involving several lines of various lengths and are told to select one of them.
Subjects are paid an amount that increases with the length of their choice and they therefore
strive to select the longest line. This design allows us to make unambiguous conclusions about
the optimality of choices. We nd a negative relationship between the optimality of choice
and the number of lines in the choice set, the lengths of the lines in the choice set, and the
similarity of the lengths of the lines in the choice set. We note that this apparent random
choice emerges from a setting without a preference for randomization, without a preference
for exibility, without private information, without multiple attributes that could possibly
interact, and is not the result of consideration set e¤ects.
Our design allows us to observe the search history and the response times. We also nd
a positive relationship between response times and the number of lines in the choice set, the
lengths of the lines in the choice set, and the similarity of the lengths of the lines in the choice
set. However, we nd evidence that suboptimal choices are associated with longer response
times than are optimal choices. This result is consistent with the predictions of Fudenberg,
Strack, and Strzalecki (2018), who study a model where an agent faces a choice with uncertain
utility and there is a constant cost of gathering information about the choice problem. The
authors show that suboptimal decisions will tend to take, on average, a longer time. We note
that their theoretical model seems to closely resemble our experimental setup. We also note
that our statistical results do not appear to su¤er from an endogeneity bias.
Since we know the objective value of each object in the choice set, our experiment produces
choice data that can investigate the statistical distribution of the errors. When we conduct
a multinomial discrete choice analysis, we nd that the errors are better described as having
a Gumbel distribution rather than a normal distribution. We also observe e¤ects that are
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consistent with (possibly endogenous) memory decay and attention.
Finally, we nd evidence that our dataset is consistent with the independence from irrele-
vant alternatives (IIA) property. Given the general nature of our choice setting, we interpret
this as suggesting that IIA could be a general feature of choice, and that violations of IIA
only occur in specic choice settings, such as those with certain proles of multiple attributes.
We admit that our results related to memory decay and attention possibly su¤er from
an endogeneity bias. In the future we are interested in studying memory decay e¤ects by
manipulating the time between the last line viewed and the response. We are also interested
in studying attention e¤ects, by manipulating the time that the subject is permitted to view
the lines. These exogenous interventions should facilitate the investigation of memory decay
and attention.
We are also interested to learn whether the e¤ects that we nd, also appear in settings
with other objectively measurable quantities. For instance, paying subjects as a function of
tones, color shade, temporal duration, or weight. We are further interested to learn the a¤ect
of various other payment schemes. We leave these questions for future research.
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Appendix
Summary statistics of the Selected longest variable and response times
Table A1 characterizes the Selected longest variable and response times in the di¢culty treat-
ments.
Table A1: Selected longest variable and response times
Easy Medium Di¢cult Pooled
96:36% 74:84% 38:50% 69:65%
9:984s 13:834s 16:070s 13:306s
The observations within the di¢culty treatments range from 3553 to 3751.
There are 10; 989 observations in the pooled analysis.
It appears to be the case that the di¢culty treatments were successful in that the longest
line is more likely to be selected in the easy treatment. Table A2 characterizes the Selected
longest variable and response time in the number of lines treatments.
Table A2: Selected longest variable and response times
2 Lines 3 Lines 4 Lines 5 Lines 6 Lines
78:11% 72:67% 69:21% 64:85% 62:91%
8:469s 11:282s 13:356s 15:704s 18:042s
The observations within the number of lines treatments range from 2181 to
2284.
It also appears that the probability that the longest line is selected is decreasing in the
number of available lines. This appears to be suggestive of choice overload, even from a
choice set of only a few simple objects. This also suggests that subjects take more time on
trials where the choice set is larger. Table A3 characterizes the Selected longest variable and
response times in the longest line length treatments.
Table A3: Selected longest variable and response times
160 176 192 208 224 240 256 272 288 304
76:4% 71:9% 72:1% 71:3% 67:9% 68:4% 69:4% 66:7% 68:6% 63:7%
12:73s 13:18s 12:36s 13:22s 12:76s 13:33s 13:09s 13:63s 13:90s 14:88s
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The observations within the longest line length treatments range from 1093 to
1102.
There appears to be a relationship between the length of the longest line in a trial and
the likelihood that the longest line was selected in that trial. Further, is also appears to be
a relationship between response time and the length of the longest line. This suggest to us a
positive relationship between the e¤ort spent and the length of the longest line in that trial.
In Table A4 we characterize the Selected longest variable and the response times according to
the number of lines and the letter label of the longest line.
Table A4: Selected longest variable and response
times by number of lines and letter label of the longest
A B C D E F
2 Lines 77:84% 78:39%        
8:546s 8:389s
3 Lines 72:39% 72:56% 73:08%      
11:272s 11:411s 11:165s
4 Lines 66:48% 61:90% 75:41% 72:48%    
13:509s 13:930s 13:015s 13:020s
5 Lines 59:86% 60:47% 63:82% 70:27% 69:54%  
16:087s 16:502s 15:010s 15:974s 15:011s
6 Lines 54:97% 56:89% 62:43% 73:24% 61:58% 67:79%
18:461s 17:957s 17:556s 17:712s 19:059s 17:543s
The observations range from 1115 to 1166 within the 2 line treatment, from 707
to 757 in the 3 line treatment, from 525 to 585 in the 4 line treatment, from 430
to 456 in the 5 line treatment, from 341 to 370 in the 6 line treatment.
There appears to be a relationship between both the Selected longest variable and response
times with the letter label of the longest line.
Summary statistics for the quality of choice and response times
Response times of the trials in which the longest line was selected is smaller than the response
times in trials in which the longest line was not selected is robust across the longest line
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treatments, the number of line treatments, and the di¢culty treatments.
Table A5: Response times
Easy Medium Di¢cult
Longest 9:936 13:498 15:645
Not 11:272 14:833 16:337
Z-stat 2:61 3:50 2:91
p-value 0:009 < 0:001 0:004
The mean response times in seconds within each di¢culty treatment, conditional
on whether the longest line was selected or not. The results of a Wilcoxon Two-
Sample Test (Z-statistic and p-value) are reported.
Table A6: Response times
2 Lines 3 Lines 4 Lines 5 Lines 6 Lines
Longest 8:063 10:722 12:468 14:742 16:735
Not 9:920 12:772 15:353 17:478 20:258
Z-stat 7:832 6:431 7:452 6:224 6:838
p-value every test < 0:001
The mean response times in seconds within each number of lines treatment,
conditional on whether the longest line was selected or not. The results of a
Wilcoxon Two-Sample Test (Z-statistic and p-value) are reported.
Table A7: Response times
160 176 192 208 224 240 256 272 288 304
Longest 11:73 12:07 11:52 12:53 11:89 12:11 12:30 12:55 12:52 13:48
Not 15:95 16:03 14:54 14:92 14:60 15:96 14:89 15:80 16:90 17:35
Z-stat 5:58 8:16 5:74 4:23 5:63 6:12 5:81 5:40 6:52 5:70
p-value every test <0:001
The mean response times in seconds within each longest line treatment, condi-
tional on whether the longest line was selected or not. The results of a Wilcoxon
Two-Sample Test (Z-statistic and p-value) are reported.
In every treatment, we see that suboptimal choices in the line selection task are associated
with a larger response time than are optimal choices.
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Robustness of the optimality of choices
In order to investigate the optimality of choices, in Table 1 we summarized logistic regressions
of the Selected longest variable. Here we perform the analogous exercise but we analyze the
Longest minus selected variable, dened to be the length of the longest line in the trial menus
the length of the line selected in that trial. As this variable is bounded below by 0, we perform
tobit regressions. The regressions are otherwise identical to those in Table 1. We summarize
these regressions in Table A8.
Table A8: Tobit regressions of Longest minus selected variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Longest line normalized 0:027 0:027 0:027 0:027
(0:003) (0:003) (0:003) (0:003)
Number of lines normalized 1:621   1:606  
(0:107) (0:110)
Easy treatment dummy  11:571  11:520  11:617  11:591
(0:481) (0:480) (0:490) (0:489)
Di¢cult treatment dummy 3:437 3:395 3:407 3:354
(0:341) (0:340) (0:350) (0:349)
Trial 0:015 0:015 0:014 0:015
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
Letter dummies No Y es No Y es
Fixed e¤ects Y es Y es No No
Demographics No No Y es Y es
AIC 31441 31400 31758 31715
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses. We
do not provide the estimates of the intercepts, the Letter dummies, the subject-
specic dummies in the xed e¤ects regressions or the demographics estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression
has 10; 989 observations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes
p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
Similar to Table 1, the accuracy of choice decreases when there is a larger number of lines
in the choice set, decreases in the length of the longest line, and decreases in the di¢cult
treatments. We also observe a decrease in accuracy across trial. It seems as if the results
presented in Table 1 are robust to the specication of the optimality of the choose.
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Robustness of the relationship between quality of choice and response times
In order to test the robustness of Table 5, we conduct a similar analysis, but we perform an
estimate of the treatment variables for every subject. In addition to estimating the standard
xed e¤ects dummies, we estimate an Easy treatment dummy coe¢cient, a Di¢cult treatment
dummy coe¢cient, a Number of lines coe¢cient estimate, and a Longest line coe¢cient esti-
mate for every subject. Below, we refer to these as the Subject-specic treatment estimates.
We also employ a specication where we estimate the Trial coe¢cient for every subject. We
refer to this as Subject-specic Trial estimates. We summarize this analysis in Table A9.
Table A9: Regressions of the log of Response time variable
(1) (2)
Trial  0:002  
(0:0001)
Select Longest  0:015  0:017
(0:004) (0:004)
Subject-specic treatment estimates Y es Y es
Subject-specic Trial estimates No Y es
Letter dummies No No
Fixed e¤ects Y es Y es
Demographics No No
AIC  4087:2  3558:4
We provide the coe¢cient estimates and the standard errors in parentheses.
We do not provide the estimates of the intercepts or the subject-specic estimates.
AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike, 1974). Each regression
has 10; 989 observations.  denotes p < 0:001,  denotes p < 0:01,  denotes
p < 0:05, and y denotes p < 0:1.
In the regressions where we estimate a unique treatment coe¢cient for every subject, we
see that the Select longest variable remains signicant. This suggests a negative relationship
between the optimal choice in the line selection task and Response time. Further, we note that
when we conduct Spearman correlations between the unstandardized residuals and the Select
longest variable in specications (1) and (2), the p-values respectively are 0:630 and 0:628.
When we conduct Pearson correlations, the qualitative results are not changed. Further, our
qualitative results are not changed when we use the standardized Pearson residuals rather
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than the unstandardized residuals. We interpret this as suggesting that our specications are
not su¤ering from an endogeneity bias caused by the inclusion of the Selected longest variable.
The results summarized in Table A9 provide additional evidence that the relationship between
response times and the optimality of the choice is not driven by a possible negative subject-
level relationship between skill at the task and the speed by which it is accomplished.
Summary statistics of the IIA analysis
Table A10 lists the number of instances where the longest line and the second longest line was
selected in trials with a unique second longest line, by di¢culty treatment and the number of
lines in the choice set.
Table A10: Longest and Second longest choices by
di¢culty treatment and number of lines in the choice set
Easy treatment
2 3 4 5 6
Longest 801 703 671 615 538
Second longest 23 11 12 14 24
Ratio 34:83 63:91 55:92 43:93 22:42
Medium treatment
2 3 4 5 6
Longest 575 528 467 444 397
Second longest 121 120 83 94 92
Ratio 4:75 4:40 5:70 4:72 4:32
Di¢cult treatment
2 3 4 5 6
Longest 414 287 235 203 125
Second longest 356 240 193 164 108
Ratio 1:16 1:20 1:22 1:24 1:16
Only trials with a unique second longest line are included. The upper panel
summarizes data from the easy treatment, the middle panel summarizes data from
the medium treatment, and the lower panel summarizes data from the di¢cult
treatment. Easier treatments and treatments with smaller choice sets are more
likely to have a unique second longest line.
In the easy treatment, there is a relationship between the longest and second longest
choices across sizes of the choice set according to a 2 test (2(4) = 12:11, p = 0:02) and a
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Kruskal-Wallis test (H(4) = 12:77, p = 0:01). However, the in the medium treatment, this
relationship is not signicant according to a 2 test (2(4) = 3:27, p = 0:51) or a Kruskal-
Wallis test (H(4) = 3:19, p = 0:53). Likewise, in the di¢cult treatment, this relationship
is not signicant according to a 2 test (2(4) = 0:35, p = 0:99) or a Kruskal-Wallis test
(H(4) = 0:38, p = 0:98).
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